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NEW MEXICO COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW AND
THE DIVISION OF RETIREMENT PLAN BENEFITS
PURSUANT TO THE DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE
JULIE NEERKEN*

I. INTRODUCTION
This article surveys law relating to the division of retirement plan
benefits in New Mexico upon dissolution of marriage. Because retirement
plan benefits form part of an increasing portion of the assets involved in
division of property pursuant to a dissolution, the issues discussed are of
growing significance to most practitioners. The first portion of this article
briefly delineates the paths courts have taken in characterizing retirement
plan benefits as community property. The second section explains the
various categories of interests in retirement plans and describes the courts'
treatment of such plans as divisible property. The third section discusses
the division of authority with respect to apportionment of disability benefits, and the fourth section discusses government retirement plans. The
fifth portion analyzes valuation issues. The final parts of the article review
the purposes of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 19741
and the problems of preemption and anti-alienation raised by that Act.
The text will cite decisions from other community property states where
New Mexico courts have not ruled upon an issue.
II. RETIREMENT PLAN BENEFITS
A. Definition of Community Property
In New Mexico, N.M. Stat. Ann. §40-3-8(B) defines community property as "property acquired by either or both spouses during marriage
which is not separate property." 2 Generally, community property does
*Associate, Poole, Tinnin & Martin, P.C.
1. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 to 1381 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) [hereinafter cited as "ERISA" or "the
Act"]. Hereinafter, for reader convenience,/when a specific section or sections of the Act are referred
to in a footnote, both the U.S.C. cite and the ERISA section cite will be given. ERISA cites refer
to Public Law and Statutes at Large section numbers. ERISA is at Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat.
829 (1974).
2. N.M. Stat. Ann. §40-3-8(B)(1978). Section 40-3-8 reads in full:
A. "Separate property" means:
(1) property acquired by either spouse before marriage or after entry of a decree
of dissolution of marriage;
(2) property acquired after entry of a decree entered pursuant to Section 40-43 NMSA 1978 unless the decree provides otherwise;
(3) property designated as separate property by a judgment or decree of any
court having jurisdiction;
(4) property acquired by either spouse by gift, bequest, devise or descent;
(5) property designated as separate property by a written agreement between
the spouses; and
(6) Each spouse's undivided interest in property owned in whole or in part by
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not include gratuities because the community receives gift property through
lucrative and not through onerous means. 3 At one time, some courts held
that retirement plan benefits were "mere gratuities," and not divisible as
community property.4 Most courts now hold that retirement plan benefits
are compensation for past services.' The basis for this holding is that
salary is not personal to the individual, but is income to the community
for the efforts of the community. 6 This is the correct result because the
nonemployee spouse should have as much expectancy in this type of
compensation as in current cash compensation.
In classifying retirement plan benefits as community property, courts
have held that it is irrelevant whether the vested benefits are attributable
to employee or employer contributions, or whether the benefits are in
pay status. 7 Where a pension plan is not a qualified retirement plan,' but
is a nonqualified excess benefit or other deferred compensation plan9 as
to which the employee-spouse may have no contractual rights, courts
should reach a comparable result. For example, if the pension is actually
a part of an employment contract for all of the vice-presidents of a given
bank, and is in effect based upon their earnings, success, and tenure, the
the spouses as cotenants in joint tenancy or as cotenants in tenancy in
common.
B. "Community property" means property acquired by either or both spouses
during marriage which is not separate property.
C. "Property" includes the rents, issues and profits thereof.
D. The right to hold property as joint tenants or as tenants in common and the
legal incidents of so holding, including but not limited to the incident of the
right of survivorship of joint tenancy, are not altered by the Community Property
Act of 1973 [40-3-6 to 40-3-17 NMSA 1978], except as provided in Sections
40-3-10, 40-3-11 and 40-3-13 NMSA 1978.
3. W. DeFuniak & M. Vaughn, Principles of Community Property § 69 (2d ed. 1971) [hereinafter
cited as DeFuniak & Vaughn].
4. See, e.g., Daigre v. Daigre, 228 La. 682, 83 S.2d 900 (1955) (holding that a pension was a
mere gratuity and not subject to division as community property upon separation).
5. See, e.g., T.L. James & Co. v. Montgomery, 332 So.2d 834 (La. 1976) (holding that retirement
plan benefits are deferred compensation earned during the existence of the community). See also
cases cited infra in notes 7, 10, 18, 20, 22, 31, 33, 35, 36, 38, 40, 42, 62, 73 & 79.
6. See, e.g., cases cited infra in notes 7, 9, 20, 22, 36, 37, 40, 44, 62, 79 & 97.
7. See, e.g., In re Fithian, 10 Cal. 3d 592, 517, P.2d 449, 111 Cal. Rptr. 369, cert. denied, 419
U.S. 825 (1974), overruled on other grounds, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633
(1976). Fithianheld that the source of contributions to a plan was irrelevant to the characterization
of plan benefits as community property. In pay status signifies retirement plan benefits which are
currently being paid to a participant or beneficiary.
8. Qualified plans are those plans that qualify for tax-exempt status under I.R.C. §§ 401(a) and
501(a). All references and citations to sections of the Internal Revenue Code in this article are to
sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended to the date of publication, unless otherwise
indicated. All references and citations to Treasury regulations are to Treasury regulations under the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended to the date of publication, unless otherwise indicated.
9. Employers maintain nonqualified excess benefit plans and unfunded "top-hat" plans to benefit
the most highly compensated employees. Many of these plans are exempt from most or all of the
provisions of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 to 1381 (1976 & Supp. V 1981), including the vesting
requirements. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(36), 1051(2), 1081(a)(3) & (8), 1101(a)(1) (1976); ERISA §§ 3(36),
201(2), 301(a)(3), (8), and 401(a)(l).
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compensation plan should be considered community property to the extent
that the earnings were part of the community. A court may wish to discount
the value of the pension to the extent that it believes that the employeespouse's rights are contingent.' 0
Once there is either a legal separation" or a dissolution of marriage,' 2
the earnings and accumulations of each of the parties are no longer
community property. 3 Therefore in New Mexico, the community begins
when the marriage begins, and ends on the date of legal separation or
dissolution. In determining what portion of a participant's interest in a
retirement plan is subject to division as community property, the court
must first ascertain the portion of the benefits that were earned during
coverture. Under the traditional Spanish community property system, onehalf of whatever was acquired, earned, gained, or purchased by the
husband and wife during the marriage belonged to each party. 14 Retirement
plan benefits may be characterized as separate property if one spouse
earned them while the marital domicile was in a separate property state,
prior to the existence of the community, or after the termination of the
community. In such a situation, the benefits are not subject to division
under the New Mexico statute.' 5 In addition, New Mexico courts have
the discretion to utilize plan benefits for the payment of alimony. 16
-10. See, -e.g., Grost-v.-Grost, 561 S.W.2d 223 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978), in which the court divided
as community property the benefits earned in an unfunded plan during coverture. A discount because
of the contingent nature of the property would be appropriate if a court concluded that there was a
substantial possibility that the benefits would never in fact be paid.
11. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-4-3 (1978) states: "Whenever the husband and wife have permanently
separated and no longer live or cohabit together as husband and wife, either may institute proceedings
in the district court for a division of property, disposition of children or alimony, without asking for
or obtaining in the proceedings, a dissolution of marriage."
12. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-4-I (1978) lists incompatibility, cruel and inhumane treatment, adultery,
and abandonment as grounds for dissolution of marriage.
13. 1943-44 Op. N.M. Att'y Gen. 245.
14. De Funiak & Vaughn, supra note 3, at §66. In Otto v. Otto, 80 N.M. 331, 455 P.2d 642
(1969), the New Mexico Supreme Court directed the trial court to determine upon remand when
the parties lived in community property jurisdictions, and to divide the retirement plan benefits
accordingly.
15. N.M. Stat. Ann. §40-3-8(A) (1978). A New Mexico court may divide the property if the
property was acquired during domicile in a noncommunity property state, and the property could
be divided under the law of that state. Hughes v. Hughes, 91 N.M. 339, 573 P.2d 1194 (1978),
involved the divorce of a couple who had spent the first II years of their marriage in Iowa, a
noncommunity property state. The couple used savings from the husband's wages during this period
for the downpayment on a ranch and apartments in New Mexico. The New Mexico Supreme Court
followed what it characterized as the general rule that property brought in from a noncommunity
property state will retain its separate property nature when traceable into New Mexico property. Id.
at 343, 573 P.2d at 1198. The court stated that under conflict of law rules, Iowa law would determine
the character of the property brought in from Iowa. Iowa law granted the wife an inchoate equitable
right in her husband's separate property. The court therefore held that the wife was entitled to a
portion of the "separate property," as that term was defined in Iowa. Id. at 346-47, 573 P.2d at
1201-1202.
16. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-4-12 (1978) permits the court to make an allowance to one spouse from
the other spouse's separate property.
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B. Classification of ParticularTypes of Interests
Retirement plans may be divided into two large categories: defined
contribution plans and defined benefit plans. Generally speaking, a defined
contribution plan is a retirement plan which defines a participant's interest
as the amount in his account when the account becomes distributable.
The benefit right is defined in terms of the contributions and earnings.
In contrast, a defined benefit plan defines the participant's benefits in
terms of a certain amount which he may anticipate receiving at retirement.
Participants may have different types of benefits. In pay status or matured
benefits are benefits which are currently being paid to a participant. Vested
but unmatured benefits are benefits which the participant cannot lose by
termination of employment, but which are not currently being paid to the
participant. Unvested and the unvested portion of partially vested benefits
are benefits which a participant will forfeit if he terminates employment.
In New Mexico, a court may divide in pay status benefits distributed
under a governmental plan as community property. For example, in Otto
v. Otto, 7 the New Mexico Supreme Court divided in pay status benefits
from a Navy retirement plan as community property. In LeClert v. LeClert,11
the supreme court held that vested benefits to a naval officer constituted
community property, notwithstanding the fact that the benefits were not
in pay status. 9 Similarly, in Copeland v. Copeland, 0 the husband had
worked twenty-four and one-fourth years of the twenty-five years required
as a prerequisite to actual retirement under a public employee retirement
plan. The New Mexico Supreme Court held that the vested but unmatured
benefits were divisible. The court noted that:
This trend toward considering unmatured pension benefits as community property subject to division upon dissolution of the community is based upon sound reasoning and equitable considerations.
Permitting the husband to keep his full benefits simply because he
still had nine months to work before he was eligible to retire would
work a great injustice. 2
Other courts have agreed with the New Mexico courts on the issue of
whether benefits not yet in pay status should be considered community
property in appropriate situations.
17. 80 N.M. 321, 455 P.2d 642 (1969).
18. 80 N.M. 235, 453 P.2d 755 (1969).
19. LeClert was decided prior to the effective date of the major law concerning private retirement
plans, ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 to 1381 (1974 & Supp. V 1981). ERISA profoundly affects the
division of benefits under most private retirement plans; therefore, it was not incumbent upon the
LeClert court to consider the anti-alienation issues discussed infra in notes 106-147 and accompanying text.
20. 91 N.M. 409, 575 P.2d 99 (1978).
21. Id. at 412, 575 P.2d at 102.
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In re Brown" was a ground-breaking decision which decreed that vested
and nonvested benefits should be treated alike when courts applied community property laws. In Brown, the California Supreme Court reversed
a long line of authority,23 and held that unvested benefits under a qualified
retirement plan were not a mere expectancy but were actual property.24
The following hypothetical illustrates why the Brown result is equitable.
Assume that a qualified retirement plan contains ten-year cliff vesting, 2s
as permitted by the Internal Revenue Code. 26 Under this method of vesting, an employee who has at least ten years of service with the employer
has a nonforfeitable right to his entire accrued benefit derived from employer contributions.*7 Prior to the crediting of ten years of service, the
employee has no vested interest in employer contributions. Assume also
that an employee covered by this plan has earned nine and one-half years
of service at the time of the dissolution of a marriage. It is probable that
this employee will earn the additional one-half year of service, at which
time his entire interest under the plan would be fully vested. It would be
unfair to characterize the employee's interest in the plan as so contingent
that it should not be divided as community property. Because plan benefits
can be one of the major assets of the community, 28 ignoring such an asset
because it is contingent produces a dramatic understatement of the value
of the community's assets.
There are no cases in New Mexico which carefully consider the question
of whether nonvested benefits under a qualified plan are subject to division
as community property. In Copeland v. Copeland,29 which dealt with fully
vested but unmatured public employee retirement benefits in a contributory plan, the New Mexico Supreme Court noted with apparent approval
that Brown and similar cases divided unvested as well as vested benefits
under qualified retirement plans. 30
Recently, in Hertz v. Hertz,3 1 the New Mexico Supreme Court held
that the district court erred in its valuation of the community property
22. 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976).
23. Id. at 844, 544 P.2d at 564, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 636.
24. Id. at 841, 544 P.2d at 562, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 634.
25. See I.R.C. §411(a)(2)(A).
26. 26 U.S.C. §§ I to 8023 (1976).
27. Employee contributions are always fully vested and may not be forfeited by reason of death
unless payments under an annuity or a similar form of benefits have already commenced. I.R.C.
§411 (a)(l); Treas. Reg. 1.41 l(b)(1)(ii). Employer contributions may be forfeited by reason of death.
Treas. Reg. 1.411(b)(1).
28. See Employee Benefit Research Institute, Retirement Income Opportunitiesin anAgingAmerica: Income Levels andAdequacy Table C-1, at 104 (1982).
29. 91 N.M. 409, 575 P.2d 99 (1978). For further discussion of Copeland, see infra text accompanying note 80.
30. 91 N.M. at 411, 575 P.2d at 101.
31. -_ N.M. -, 657 P.2d 1169 (1983).
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interest in a qualified retirement plan. One ground of error was that the
district court valued the husband's interest in the plan at full face value,
although the husband was only seventy-five percent vested in the plan.
The court held that: "The correct valuation in the plan is one-half of
husband's (75%) vested interest of the percentage owned (3.1518%) of
the reasonable value of the plan ($91,880.40) on the date of the divorce ...."32 In considering the value of the interest in the retirement
33
plan, the supreme court only cited its decision in Ridgway v. Ridgway.
34
Ridgway involved the division of a fully vested account and therefore
did not present the issue of the valuation of unvested benefits. The Hertz
court never discussed the problem of valuing unvested benefits, appears
never to have considered discounting the value of the unvested benefits,
and cited neither Brown nor the Copeland dicta approving Brown. It is
hoped that when a New Mexico court carefully weighs the equities of
dividing unvested benefits under a qualified retirement plan, New Mexico
will join the states which hold that a community property division of such
benefits is appropriate.
III. DISABILITY BENEFITS
A separate issue from the division of retirement benefits payable on
account of age is the community property division of disability retirement
benefits from retirement plans. A conflict in the treatment of disability
benefits has emerged among the states which has substantial implications
for the divisibility of disability benefits as community property. Much of
the reason for this split in authority is no doubt due to the diverse nature
of disability benefits. Some disability pensions step into the place of
regular retirement pensions and simply permit an early retirement on the
basis of disability. Other disability benefits contain elements of an earned
regular retirement pension along with elements which compensate for
physical injury. Yet other benefits (more similar to pure insurance), which
cease for a terminated employee regardless of the length of his employment, are paid for disability alone.35
The New Mexico Supreme Court has considered the division of disability benefits only under governmental retirement plans. In Luxton v.
Luxton,36 the New Mexico Supreme Court held that United States Civil
Service medical retirement benefits were subject to division as community
657 P.2d at 1178 (emphasis added).
32. Id. at -,
33. 94 N.M. 345, 610 P.2d 749 (1980).
34. Id. at 347, 610 P.2d at 751.
35. In re Kittleson, 21 Wash. App. 344, 350, 585 P.2d 167, 173 (1978).
36. 98 N.M. 276, 648 P.2d 315 (1982). In Stroshine v. Stroshine, 98 N.M. 742, 652 P.2d 1193
(1982), the New Mexico Supreme Court held that the husband's Veterans Administration disability
benefits were community property.
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property. The Luxton court, which decided the case after the United States
Supreme Court decided McCarty v. McCarty,37 stated that Congress intended such retirement benefits to be subject to state property law. The
court also noted that the legislative history of the pertinent sections of
the statute establishing the retirement system supported the conclusion
that such benefits were community assets. In Hughes v. Hughes,3" an
earlier case which the supreme court also decided after McCarty, the court
found "no indication that Congress intended that the federal [civil service39
disability] benefits involved in this case be treated as separate property."
The court therefore applied case law dealing with non-federal disability
benefits. Citing an Idaho case,' the Hughes court found that the husband
became entitled to disability pay during coverture by virtue of his contributions to the retirement and disability4 fund, and applied a presumption
that the asset was community property. '
In In re Kittleson,42 the Washington Court of Appeals held that under
certain circumstances, there should be community property division of
disability payments from non-governmental retirement plans. In Kittleson, the court reviewed the authority from California which supported
the proposition that because disability payments are compensation for
personal anguish and lost earning capacity and are comparable to damages
for personal injury, such payments are therefore the recipient spouse's
separate property."3 The Washington court noted that in the Kittleson case,
the husband had an election between taking either his regular retirement
benefits or taking the disability award." The court held that trial courts
should determine on a case-by-case basis whether disability pay should
be considered community property. The court stated that an inflexible
37. 453 U.S. 210 (1981). For a discussion of McCarty v. McCarty, see infra text accompanying
notes 48-59.
38. 96 N.M. 719, 634 P.2d 1271 (1981).
39. Id. at 722, 634 P.2d at 1274.
40. Guy v. Guy, 98 Idaho 205, 560 P.2d 876 (1977). In Guy, the Idaho Supreme Court held that
disability benefits payable under an employee group insurance policy were consideration for past
employment; therefore, future benefit payments were community property.
41. 96 N.M. at 722, 634 P.2d at 1274.
42. 21 Wash. App. 344, 585 P.2d 167 (1978). In Arizona, courts consider disability payments
to be community property. See, e.g., Flowers v. Flowers, 118 Ariz. 577, 578 P.2d 1006 (Ct. App.
1978).
585 P.2d at 171-72. Traditionally, California courts considered
43. 21 Wash. App. at -,
disability benefits to be payment for personal injury. Therefore, such benefits were not community
property. See In re Jones, 13 Cal. 3d 457, 531 P.2d 420, 119 Cal. Rptr. 108 (1975), overruled on
other grounds, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976). Recently, the California
Supreme Court has shown signs of modifying its stand on disability retirement payments. In In re
Stenquist, 21 Cal. 3d 779, 582 P.2d 96, 148 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1978), and In re Cavnar, 62 Cal. App.
3d 660, 133 Cal. Rptr. 267 (1976), the courts held that when a court considers disability pay which
is in lieu of retirement pay, it is proper to consider the pay to be community property to the extent
that the disability pay actually is in lieu of retirement pay.
44. 21 Wash. App. at -, 585 P.2d at 172.
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rule that required a disability pension to be classified as separate property
would ignore important distinctions among the various forms of disability
payments. 4"
It is probable that when the New Mexico courts are faced with the
issue of divisibility of disability payments from qualified retirement plans,
they will find that such disability payments are community property. The
New Mexico courts will undoubtedly rely on Hughes v. Hughes and cases,
such as In re Kittleson, from other jurisdictions.
IV. GOVERNMENT PLANS
The provisions of Title I of ERISA,46 which include reporting and
disclosure requirements, participation and vesting requirements, fiduciary
responsibility rules, and administrative and enforcement procedures, do
not apply to governmental plans4 7 as that term is defined in ERISA §3(32).
Section 3(32) defines a governmental plan as a plan established or maintained by the government of the United States, by the government of any
state or political subdivision thereof, or by any agency or instrumentality
of the foregoing for its employees. Because governmental plans are not
covered by ERISA, the questions of the permissibility of dividing benefits
under such plans, and the preemption of state property law by federal
law in the case of federal government plans, will now be discussed.
A. Military and RailroadRetirement Pay
In McCarty v. McCarty,4 8 the United States Supreme Court held that
federal law precluded a California court from dividing, pursuant to state
community property law, the federally created right to military retired
pay. The basis for this holding was that there was a conflict between the
federal military retirement scheme and the community property right
asserted by the wife. The Supreme Court stated that the military retirement
system conferred no entitlement to retired pay upon the wife and did not
embody even a limited community property concept.49
Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court, found that the language,
45. Id. at __, 585 P.2d at 173.
46. ERISA Title I contains Subtitle A, 29 U.S.C. 88 1001 to 1003 (1976 & Supp. V 1981), which
has general provisions such as statements concerning policy and coverage, and Subtitle B, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1021 to 1144 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) which has regulatory provisions dealing with reporting and
disclosure, participation and vesting, funding, fiduciary responsibility, and administration and enforcement.
47. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(1)(1976); ERISA §4(b)(1).
48. 453 U.S. 210 (1981). See Comment, McCartyism in New Mexico: McCarty v. McCarty and
the Uniformed Services FormerSpouses' ProtectionAct, post at 663, for further discussion of McCarty
[hereinafter cited as Comment].
49. 453 U.S. at 224.
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structure, and history of the statute providing for retirement pay indicated
that retirement pay is the personal entitlement of the retiree. The Court
felt that the application of community property principles to military
retirement pay would threaten "grave harm to clear and substantial federal
interests." 5 ° Any division of the retirement pay as community property
would reduce the amount that Congress had determined was necessary
for retired service personnel. This reduction could potentially frustrate
the congressional objective of providing for the retired service member
and interfere with congressional goals of having the military retirement
system serve as an inducement for enlistment and reenlistment . 5 The
Supreme Court stated that the injunction against attachment of military
retirement pay was not to be circumvented by an offsetting award of other
property.52
Justice Blackmun relied strongly on Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo,53 a California case concerning the division of retirement benefits. In Hisquierdo,
the United States Supreme Court held that federally-created railroad retirement benefits were not subject to division under state community
property laws. The Hisquierdo Court also stated that "in the rare occasion when state family law has come into conflict with a federal statute,
this Court has limited review under the Supremacy Clause to a determination whether Congress has 'positively required by direct enactment'
that state law be preempted." 54 Although Hisquierdo reaffirmed the principle that family law is the province of the states, both the Hisquierdo
and the McCarty Courts found a federal preemption of the state property
law.
The result in McCarty was both harsh and unnecessary and the holding
has in effect been legislatively overruled.56 The legislation allows state
courts to divide military retirement pay as part of a property settlement
in a marital dissolution if the couple was married for at least ten years
during which time one spouse was in military service. Regardless of the
duration of the marriage, military'retirement pay can be the source of
alimony or child support payments. The statute requires that the court
order affecting military retirement pay be a final decree served personally
50. Id. at 232.
51. Id. at 234-35.
52. Id. at 228 n. 22.
53. 439 U.S. 572 (1979).
54. Id. at 581.
55. It is the author's opinion that the McCarty court did not convincingly find a direct preemption
of state property law, nor did it convincingly set forth a strong federal interest opposed to the division
of property pursuant to community property concepts. Further discussion of this issue is beyond the
scope of this article.
56. Uniformed Services Former Spouses Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 97-252, §§ 1001 to 1006,
96 Stat. 730 (1982) (to be codified in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C.) (effective Feb. 1, 1983). See
Comment, supra note 48, for further discussion of this legislation.
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or by certified or registered mail upon the secretary of the appropriate
branch of the armed services.
One by-product of McCarty is that courts, in considering retirement
plans not covered by the new legislation, will now have to treat preemption
issues" 7 more exhaustively. Until McCarty, courts deciding cases involving governmental plans used reasoning very similar to the reasoning used
when considering qualified retirement plans. After McCarty, the quest for
legislative intent will often be the primary concern. Additionally, although
McCarty did not pertain to plans covered by ERISA, the case raises some
question as to whether the United States Supreme Court is becoming less
deferential to state property law and less solicitious of the rights of nonemployee spouses in retirement plans. The New Mexico Supreme Court
has indicated that it will read the McCarty case narrowly. In Stroshine v.
Stroshine,5 8 the supreme court stated that:
In McCarty, the United States Supreme Court specifically restricted
its holding only to military nondisability retirement pay ....

Ac-

cordingly, absent any clear expression to the contrary, there is no
federal preemption of state domestic relations law with respect to
disability retirement pay ....
and not the rule .... 59

McCarty remains yet the exception,

B. New Mexico State Pensions
Section 4(b) of ERISA exempts state government retirement plans from
its coverage. The State of New Mexico has established a retirement plan
for its employees. 6 In Copeland v. Copeland,6 1 the New Mexico Supreme
Court held that benefits payable under the New Mexico Public Employees
Retirement Act should be divided as community property. The court made
no reference to the legislative history or intent and relied heavily on case
law from other jurisdictions. 62
57. It is currently unclear when the division of private retirement plan benefits upon dissolution
of a marriage violates federal law. See infra text accompanying notes 106-117. The McCartydecision
arguably bolsters the position that ERISA's anti-alienation statute forbids such a division.
58. 98 N.M. 742, 652 P.2d 1193 (1982). See supra note 36.
59. 98 N.M. at 743, 652 P.2d at 1194.
60. See Public Employees Retirement Act, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 10-11-1 to -38 (Repl. Pamp. 1980
& Cum. Supp. 1982).
61. 91 N.M. 409, 575 P.2d 99 (1978).
62. Id. at 411, 575 P.2d at 101. The court relied on cases considering qualified retirement plans
and military pension plans. In re Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976),
was the first major case holding that unvested retirement plan benefits may be subject to division
as community property. See supra text accompanying notes 22-24 for further discussion of Brown.
In Wilder v. Wilder, 85 Wash. 2d 364, 534 P.2d 1355 (1975), the husband would have been eligible
to receive military pension benefits only if he reenlisted, as he indicated he would. The Washington
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision and awarded the wife a portion of the pension. In
Cearley v. Cearley, 544 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1976), the Texas Supreme Court held that the military
pension was a contingent interest in property and a community asset.
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V. VALUATION ISSUES
When a court divides retirement plan benefits pursuant to the division
of community property, one of the most important and complex issues
can be valuing the benefits. Valuation issues may be fairly straightforward
when the benefits under a plan are in pay status. A court only has to
calculate the amount of the benefit which is community property, and
divide the benefit accordingly. When benefits are not in pay status, and
particularly when benefits are unvested or partially vested, valuation may
be difficult.
Before valuing the benefits, a court must first value the plan itself. In
Hertz v. Hertz,6 3 the New Mexico Supreme Court determined the value
of the profit sharing plan of the husband's law firm. The trial court had
divided contributions which had been authorized by the employer's board
of directors but which had not yet been included in the valuation of the
plan's assets on the date of divorce. The plan was valued on June 30th
of each year and the date of the divorce was December 31, 1979. 64 The
New Mexico Supreme Court summarized the plan provisions concerning
the date on which contributions would be considered as having been
made. The court then stated that trial courts "may use an undiscounted
current actual value at the date of divorce, if the present value of the
plan cannot be ascertained by substantial evidence. "65 The supreme court
held that it was "an abuse [of the trial court's] discretion to value the
plan six months after the community was dissolved. The correct approach
in this case is to value the community interest in the profit sharing plan
as of the date of the divorce. "' It is commendable to utilize a flexible
approach toward valuation of a plan's assets, so that increases or decreases
in the value of a participant's share of the plan's assets will be properly
reflected in the division of property. In many instances, however, a court
should use caution in valuing authorized but unpaid contributions to profit
sharing plans because a variety of events (including the absence of profit
at year's end), could affect the amount of the actual contribution. Because
of the dates involved in the Hertz case,67 presumably the contribution had
been made. If the contribution had not been made, the court would have
considered this factor in its valuation of the benefits.
Copeland v. Copeland68 is the seminal New Mexico case dealing with
valuation of benefits. In Copeland, the husband, whose retirement benefits
were at issue, was fully vested in his benefits. In addition, if he elected
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

N.M. -_,657 P.2d 1169 (1983).
Id.at -, 657 P.2d at 1177.
Id.
Id.
The date of divorce was December 31, 1979, but the opinion was not issued until early 1983.
91 N.M. 409, 575 P.2d 99 (1978).
-
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to retire in nine months, his benefits would become fully mature at that
time.69 The husband could have withdrawn his contributions, however,
thereby forfeiting all employer-provided benefits. The husband's death
would have also resulted in a forfeiture of the employer-derived portion
of the retirement benefits. Testimony indicated that if the husband retired
in nine months he could expect approximately $200,000.00 in benefits.7°
The trial court, troubled by the contingencies surrounding the employerderived portion of plan benefits, had included only $15,000.00 (the amount
of employee contributions), as community property. The New Mexico
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the value of the entire retirement
benefit was subject to division. 7 '
The Copeland court devoted much of its discussion to a careful consideration of the valuation problems raised by the facts before it, and the
problems likely to occur in other common fact patterns. The court first
recognized that the actuarial value of pensions generally exceeds the
accumulated employee contributions .72 The court then described two general approaches toward dealing with the contingencies involved in plan
benefits. One approach is to derive a value for the benefits at the time
of dissolution by determining life expectancy and discounting for present
73
value by use of actuarial tables. The court noted that in In re Brown,
the California trial court was instructed to take account of the possibility
of death or termination of employment.74 Under the second approach, a
court can award either a specified amount or a certain percentage of the
benefits to the nonparticipant spouse if, when, and as the benefits are
paid. 75 This method leaves the risks of the contingencies apportioned
between the two spouses, but involves more complex court administration.
The Copeland court instructed the trial court to make a division of
assets which included the present value of the unmatured benefits "or
divide the pension on a pay as it comes in system."7 6 The Copeland court
noted that if the community has sufficient other assets to offset the value
of the pension, an immediate division incorporating such an offset would
make a final disposition possible.77 If the pension is the principal asset
of the community, and the participant spouse cannot deliver property
69. Id. at 410, 575 P.2d at 100.
70. Id. at 412, 575 P.2d at 102.
71. Id. at 414, 575 P.2d at 104.
72. Id. at 413, 575 P.2d at 103.
73. 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976). See supra notes 22-24 and
accompanying text for further discussion of Brown.
74. 91 N.M. at 413, 575 P.2d at 103.
75. Id. at 414, 575 P.2d at 104.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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worth the nonparticipant spouse's interest in the plan,
then the trial court
78
could proceed on the "pay as it comes in" system.
In Ridgway v. Ridgway,79 the appellant challenged the trial court's
valuation of his interest in a noncontributory profit sharing plan. The
New Mexico Supreme Court interpreted the trial court's decree as an
award of the undiscounted current actual value of the participant's vested
but unmatured benefits in the plan as of the date of divorce. The supreme
court held that this was a proper award. The Ridgway court stated that
in Copeland v. Copeland,8" it had not established an inflexible rule that
trial courts could apply only the present value method of valuation. 8 The
present value, the court explained, is the amount which must be invested
at present to produce a given amount at a set time in the future. This
method of valuation is most appropriate when the plan is a defined benefit
plan. Under Copeland, the trial court must apply the present value method
where the evidence of that value is sufficient. The current actual value
may be applied if the present value cannot be ascertained.
The Ridgway court stated that the evidence was not sufficient to apply
the present value method of valuation. The court felt that there was no
certainty under the profit sharing plan as to what benefits would be available upon retirement because the benefits were "contingent upon the
success or failure of the business operation." 82 The latter phrase indicates
that counsel may not have given the court an adequate briefing on the
operation of the profit sharing plan because it does not appear that the
success of the business in future years would not have an effect on the
property earned during coverture unless the plan involved employee stock
ownership. The court nonetheless reached a fair result by affirming the
division of the current amount in the participant's account. Because the
appellant contested only the method of valuation, it is not clear how the
trial court addressed the problem of current versus deferred distribution.
In summary, where there are vested and in pay status benefits, the
valuation problems are minimal. The benefits payable each month should
be divided by a fraction, the numerator of which represents the number
of years of coverture during which the participant earned the benefits
under the plan, and the denominator of which reflects the number of years
of service during which plan benefits were accrued. The result will reflect
the portion of the benefits which is community property, and the court
should divide the benefits accordingly. Where there are vested benefits
which are not in pay status, courts must evaluate relevant contingencies,
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id.
94 N.M. 345, 610 P.2d 749 (1980).
91 N.M. 409, 575 P.2d 99 (1978).
94 N.M. at 347, 610 P.2d at 751.
Id.
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such as the amount of the death benefit, if any, the health of the participant,
and similar facts. Where there are unvested or partially vested benefits,
the court can value the benefits presently or can retain jurisdiction. Valuing
benefits presently can be speculative, but retaining jurisdiction is judicially
inefficient and forces the parties to continue to deal with each other.83
VI. ERISA
ERISA 84

regulates most private retirement plans. ERISA preempts inconsistent state law 5 and plans covered by ERISA must prohibit the
assignment and alienation of benefits.8 6 Most state courts have held,
however, that benefits under retirement plans subject to ERISA may
constitute property which state courts may divide. Because the prohibition
against alienation and the scope of preemption are unclear, there is not
only confusion, but also the sentiment that many state court decrees raise
legal issues which cannot be resolved.87
Congress enacted ERISA to protect the continued well-being and security of employees and their dependants.8 8 Both the Internal Revenue
Service and the Department of Labor have jurisdiction over portions of
ERISA. 89 ERISA covers employee benefit plans established by any employer engaged in commerce or in any industry or activity affecting
commerce, or established by any employee organization or organizations
representing employees engaged in commerce or in any industry or activity affecting commerce. ° ERISA does not apply to government plans,
church plans which have made no election to be covered, plans maintained
solely to comply with workmen's compensation or unemployment compensation or disability insurance laws, plans maintained out of the United
States primarily for the benefit of aliens, or excess benefit plans which
are not funded. 9 Additionally, the Department of Labor by regulation
may exempt certain kinds of plans from portions of ERISA. 92 An ERISA
reorganization plan93 delegated authority to the Department of Labor with
respect to the interpretation of provisions relating to preemption and
alienation of plan benefits. 94
83. For examples of the types of extended litigation which can develop, see Kilberg & Heron,
Dissolution of Marriage and Support Payments: ERISA & the Non-employee Spouse's Interest in
Plan Benefits, Pension and Profit Sharing (P-H) 1079 (1978).
84. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 to 1381 (1974 & Supp. V 1981.)
85. See infra text accompanying notes 97-104.
86. See infra text accompanying notes 106-147.
87. See infra text accompanying note 114.
88. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (Supp. V 1981), ERISA §4.
89. Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 47,713 (Oct. 17, 1978) (executive order).
90. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a) (1976), ERISA § 4(a).
91. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a) & (b) (1976), ERISA §4(a) & (b).
92. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(B) (Supp. V 1981), ERISA §3(2)(B).
93. See supra note 89.
94. See infra text accompanying notes 106-113.
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A. Preemption
Section 514(a) of ERISA contains a broad preemption of state laws.
That section reads as follows:
Except as provided in Subsection (b) of this section, the provisions
of this title and Title IV shall supercede any and all State laws insofar
as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan
described in § 4(a) and not exempt under §4(b). This Section shall
take effect on January 1, 1975." 5

The Department of Labor, which has primary authority with respect to
preemption,' has not yet developed regulations under ERISA §514. Most
97
courts have held that section 514(a) does not preempt state property law.
The California dissolution of marriage statute specifically identifies retirement plan benefits as divisible property. 98
In Stone v. Stone, 99 Judge Renfrew, a federal district court judge,
articulately set forth the rationale for this position. Judge Renfrew stated
that ERISA §514(a) was not designed to preempt every state law with
even the most tangential relation to ERISA. 1o0 The opinion acknowledged
the presumption that federal law does not supersede the historic police
powers of the state unless that was the clear manifest purpose of Congress.
The court found that this presumption controlled in the question of
preemption of community property law under ERISA §514(a).'10 The
court found no clear evidence of congressional intent to preempt state
community property laws insofar as they relate to employee benefit plans.
The Stone court reasoned that preemption would deprive nonemployee
spouses of a share in marital assets which these spouses indirectly helped
to acquire, and would leave such spouses without effective remedy against
their participant spouses.' 2
The Stone analysis is correct because both domestic relations law and
property law are areas of strong state concern, and United States Supreme
Court cases have established the preferred position of state regulation in
these areas.' 03 States should be the principal source of substantive do95. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1976), ERISA §514(a).
96. T.D. 7534, 1978-1 C.B. 119.
97. See Stone v. Stone, 450 F. Supp. 919 (N.D. Cal. 1978), aff'd, 632 F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 453 U.S. 922 (1981). See also Central States Pension Fund v. Parr, 480 . Supp. 924
(E.D. Mich. 1979); Senco of Florida, Inc. v. Clark, 473 F. Supp. 902 (M.D. Fla. 1979); Carpenters
Pension Trust v. Kronschnabel, 460 F. Supp. 978 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
98. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 4363.1 (West Supp. 1983). There is no comparable New Mexico
provision.
99. 450 F. Supp. 919 (N.D. Cal. 1978), aff'd, 632 F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453
U.S. 922 (1981).
100. 450 F. Supp. at 932.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 932-33.
103. In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586 (1890); United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341 (1966).
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mestic relations law, and courts should find preemption only when necessary to accomplish the important federal interest underlying ERISA,
the promotion of guaranteed retirement income. In Francis v. United
Technologies Corp., o for example, a California federal district court did
not properly weigh federal law and state interests. The Francis court
specifically disagreed with Judge Renfrew's "analysis of Congressional
intent in regard to the preemptive effect of ERISA," 105 and found that
ERISA preempted state property law. The nonemployee spouse was therefore not able to obtain a decree granting her any interest in the retirement
plan in which her ex-spouse was a participant. Such interference with
state law does not serve the purposes underlying ERISA.
B. Anti-Alienation
1. The Anti-Alienation Provisions.
Both the tax and labor provisions of ERISA' contain an anti-alienation
rule. The Internal Revenue Service has the primary authority to interpret
the anti-alienation provisions of ERISA.107 I.R.C. §401(a)(13) requires
all qualified plans, that is, plans which qualify for tax-exempt status under
I.R.C. §401, to provide that benefits under the plan may not be assigned
or alienated.1 8
In Treasury Regulation § 1.401(a)-13, the Internal Revenue Service
interpreted the provisions of I.R.C. §401(a)(13). The regulation defines
assignment or alienation to include any direct or indirect arrangement
(whether revocable or irrevocable), whereby a party acquires from a
participant or beneficiary a right or interest enforceable against the plan,
or to all or any part of a plan benefit payment which is, or may become,
payable to the participant or beneficiary." The treasury regulation lists
specific arrangements not considered assignments or alienations. These
exceptions do not include division of plan benefits pursuant to dissolution
of marriage."o Regulations dealing with the division of benefits incidental
104. 458 F. Supp. 84 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
105. Id. at 86.
106. ERISA contains four titles. Title I1contains modifications to the Internal Revenue Code,
and all citations to that title are referred to in I.R.C. citation form for convenience. For example,
I.R.C. §401(a)(13) is ERISA § 1021(c). Title I of ERISA contains various provisions, some of
which are similar to Internal Revenue Code provisions; these provisions are under the jurisidiction
of the Department of Labor and are referred to as the labor provisions. Title III treats jurisdiction,
administration, and enforcement matters, and Title IV deals with insurance of certain pension benefits
by a federal agency, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.
107. See supra note 89.
108. I.R.C. § 401(a)(13) reads as follows: "A trust shall not constitute a qualified trust under this
section unless the plan of which such trust is a part provides that the benefits provided under the
plan may not be assigned or alienated.
109. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-13(c).
110. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-13(c)(2).
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to a dissolution of marriage would have substantial weight and would
provide guidance to practitioners.
The labor provision, ERISA § 206(d)(1), also requires retirement plans
to prohibit assignment or alienation.'' There are no regulations under
ERISA § 206.
The legislative history indicates that the purpose of ERISA's antialienation provisions was to prevent creditors from attaching retirement
plan benefits. 1 2 Courts have found congressional intent to ensure, through
the anti-alienation rules, that the benefits were available for the financial
support of the participant and his family after retirement.11 3 The legislative
history is silent on the division of retirement plan benefits as community
property and whether or not that is an alienation within the scope of
section 401(a)(13) of the Internal Revenue Code and ERISA §206(d).
2. Sanctions.
It is possible for a court to order immediate distribution of assets divided
pursuant to divorce in a manner which the Internal Revenue Service finds
unacceptable.' The results of violation of the anti-alienation and distribution clauses could include disqualification of a plan. The fiduciary who
complies with such a court order may also be violating ERISA §404,
which requires adherence to the terms of a plan. Violation of new I.R.C.
§72(p)(1)(B) 5 results in treatment of the amount alienated or assigned
as current taxable income to the assigning or pledging participant. The
latter sanction seems more in line with the nature of the violation; disconsequences to the emqualification of the entire plan has adverse tax
116
ployer and all of the participants in the plan.
Courts should impose sanctions for impermissible distributions only
upon the participant in cases where the employer or plan administrator
111. ERISA § 206(d)(1) reads as follows: "Each pension plan shall provide that the benefits
provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated." 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1976).
112. H. Rep. No. 807, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1974), reprinted in U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 4670, 4734.
113. See, e.g., Stone v. Stone, 450 F. Supp. 919 (N.D. Cal. 1978), aft'd, 632 F.2d 740 (9th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 922 (1981), and cases cited infra in notes 125, 133 & 140.
114. See, e.g., Private Ltr. Rul. 8010051 (Dec. 12, 1979), reprinted in I.R.S. Letter Rulings
(CCH) No. 159 (Mar. 15, 1980).
115. The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 325
(1982), added I.R.C. § 72(p)(1)(B), which states:
ASSIGNMENTS OR PLEDGES.-If during any taxable year a participant or
beneficiary assigns (or agrees to assign) or pledges (or agrees to pledge) any
portion of his interest in a qualified employer plan, such portion shall be treated
as having been received by such individual as a loan from such plan.
The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act repealed § 72(m)(4) which was a provision analogous
to § 72(p)(l)(B) but which was applicable only to partnership plans.
116. It is not clear at this time which sanction the Internal Revenue Service will impose for
violations of the anti-alienation and distribution clauses.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13

has acted properly. Obeying a court order to distribute assets pursuant to
a divorce decree is an example of acting properly. The anti-alienation
sections of ERISA should be interpreted only to provide an outside limit
on how state courts may treat retirement benefits from qualified plans in
marriage dissolution proceedings." 7 The anti-alienation rules should pose
a restraint on state domestic relations proceedings only when consistency
with the purposes or provisions of the federal law concerning retirement
plans is at stake.
The Department of Labor and Internal Revenue Services' Position
With Respect to Preemption and Anti-Alienation
There is a line of cases"' which find an exception to the assignment
and alienation prohibitions of ERISA for actions for family support obligations. The cases have relied on the assumption that the purpose of
the anti-alienation rules is to ensure that benefits are available for the
participant and the participant's beneficiaries. Similarly, there is authority
implying an exception to ERISA § 514(a) so that that section does not
preempt state property law classifying plan benefits as property subject
to division upon dissolution of marriage." 9
Some commentators have reacted with apparent approval or little comment to the courts' positions with respect to the anti-alienation provisions
C.

of ERISA.120 One commentary'

21

strongly criticized these judicial hold-

ings on the grounds that the preemption rulings with respect to the issue
of state property law are not consistent with the otherwise broad preemption of state laws by ERISA, and22 that only Congress should establish
such an exception to preemption.

1

The Department of Labor wrote an amicus brief 23 considering this
issue during the Ninth Circuit's consideration of Stone v. Stone.' 2 1 In its
brief, the Department argued that while ERISA §514 preempts com117. This article does not discuss theformulation of court orders dealing with plan assets in the
context of a dissolution of marriage. In general, courts should not order plans to make payments
which would result in payment in a form not provided for in the plan, or of an amount greater than
otherwise payable from the plan.
118. See supra cases cited in note 97.
119. See, e.g., Pension and Profit Sharing (P-H) 8975 (1983).
120. See Kroll, Divorce Under ERISA, 37 N.Y.U. Inst. Fed. Tax'n § 3.01-3.05 (ERISA Supp.
1979); Solomon, Beyond Preemption:Accommodation of the Nonemployee Spouses' Interest under
ERISA, 31 Hastings L.J. 1021 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Solomon]; Stripling, Transfer of Pension
Benefits Incident to Divorce, 54 J. of Tax'n 216-22 (1981).
121. See Hutchinson & Ifshin, Federal Preemptionof State Law under the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 23 (1978). Mr. Hutchison was Administrator of
the Pension and Welfare Program in the Department of Labor.
122. Id. at 65.
123. Reprinted in full in 37 N.Y.U. Inst. Fed. Tax'n § 3.07 (ERISA Supp. 1979).
124. 632 F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 922 (1981).
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munity property law as to employee benefit plans, there is an implied
exception to the anti-alienation rules for the enforcement of state court
orders relating to benefits in pay status in community property divisions.
In Stone, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the United States
Supreme Court's summary dismissal of the appeal in CarpentersPension
Trust Fund v. Campa'25 resolved the preemption and anti-alienation issues.
In Campa, the Supreme Court dismissed, for want of a substantial federal
question, a case in which the appellant trust fund contended that ERISA
§514 preempted California community property law, and therefore, that
the trial court's division of the husband's retirement benefits was in
violation of I.R.C. § 401(a)(13) and beyond the power of the trial court.
In its decision,126 the California Court of Appeals had held that community
property law not only did not frustrate the congressional intent underlying
ERISA of assuring genuine pension rights, but was consistent with the
objective of assuring that the members of a participant's family receive
the pension which they anticipated.' 27 The court noted that "domestic
relations is a field peculiarly suited to state regulation and control, and
peculiarly unsuited to control by federal courts."' 28 Because the nonemployee spouse's rights in the retirement plan were those of an owner, not
a creditor, the anti-alienation rules were not contravened. The California
court found further support for this proposition in the fact that Congress
explicitly and selectively preempted community property law in certain
sections of ERISA. 129 The court also held that the preemption test set
forth in Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo30 did not affect its reasoning because
in that case, the United States Supreme Court had expressly distinguished
ERISA and specifically stated that its decision did not reach that statute. 131
The Department of Labor demonstrated its position regarding preemption not only by its amicus brief in Stone v. Stone,'32 which involved a
community property state, but also in its amicus curiae brief in American
' which involved a marriage
Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Merry, 33
dissolution in a non-community property state. In addition, 80 Dept. of
125. 444 U.S. 1028 (1980).
126. In re Campa, 89 Cal. App. 3d 113, 152 Cal. Rptr. 362 (1979).
127. Id. at 119, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 368.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 120, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 369.
130. 439 U.S. 572 (1979).
131. 89 Cal. App. 3d at 124, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 373.
132. 632 F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 922 (1981).
133. 592 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1979). In Merry, the Second Circuit affirmed enforcement of a
Connecticut court order garnishing an interest in the A.T.&T. pension plan for arrearages in alimony
and child support orders. The court found an implied exception to both the anti-alienation and
preemption rules of ERISA where enforcement of state family support orders is concerned. See
Solomon, supra note 120, at 1021 nn. 1 & 23. Ms. Solomon states that the Tax Division of the
Justice Department filed amicus curiae briefs for both the Secretaries of Labor and the Treasury in
Merry. Ms. Solomon wrote the amicus curiae brief in Stone for Equal Rights Advocates.
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Labor Op. Letter 39A states that there is an implied exception to the antialienation rules without referring to the preemption issue, and refers to
the Department of Labor's amicus brief filed in Stone.
The Internal Revenue Service concurs that certain types of divisions
of retirement plan benefits do not contravene the anti-alienation rule. The
Internal Revenue Service's position is shown by its concurrence in the
Department of Labor's amicus briefs in Stone'34 and Merry.'3 5 Further,
1 the Internal Revenue Service stated that there would
in a revenue ruling, 36
be no disqualification if a pension plan complied with a court order
regarding distribution of in pay status benefits to meet a participant's
alimony or support obligations. Although this revenue ruling did not apply
to community property law, the rationale should be the same, and the
same results should be permitted in a division of property in a community
property jurisdiction. 137
In addition, the Internal Revenue Service has issued private letter rulings with respect to the division of retirement plan benefits as community
property pursuant to the dissolution of a marriage. Although private letter
rulings have no precedential value and, under I.R.C. § 6110(j)(3), cannot
be cited as precedent, such rulings do represent the Internal Revenue
Service's position. Private Letter Ruling 8027041138 stated that in pay
status benefits were divisible as community property but Private Letter
Ruling 8304089 39 stated that payment to a nonemployee spouse of vested
benefits which were not currently in pay status would disqualify the plan.
Under the Internal Revenue Code, individual retirement accounts may be
divided pursuant to divorce decrees.'40 In Private Letter Ruling 8007024, "1
the Internal Revenue Service permitted the rollover from a corporate plan
plan of plan benefits pursuant to a division of
to an individual retirement
42
community property.
The Ninth Circuit once noted 143 that a summary dismissal by the United
States Supreme Court of an appeal from a state court for want of a
134. 37 N.Y.U. Inst. Fed. Tax'n § 3 (ERISA Supp. 1979).
135. See Solomon, supra note 120, at 1021 n.l.
136. Rev. Rul. 80-27, 1980-1 C.B. 85-86.
137. A revenue ruling has substantial precedential value. See Rev. Proc. 72-1, 1972-1 C.B. 694,
which states that revenue rulings "are published to provide precedents to be used in the disposition
of other cases, and may be cited and relied upon for that purpose."
138. Private Ltr. Rul. 8027041 (Apr. 9, 1980), reprinted in I.R.S. Letter Rulings (CCH) No.
176 (July 16, 1980).
139. Private Ltr. Rul. 8304089 (undated), reprinted in I.R.S. Letter Rulings (CCH) No. 309
(Feb. 2, 1983).
140. I.R.C. § 408(d)(6) and Treas. Reg. § 1.408-4(g).
141. Private Ltr. Rul. 8007024 (Nov. 21, 1979), reprinted in I.R.S. Letter Rulings (CCH) No.
156 (Feb. 28, 1980).
142. A rollover is a direct or indirect tax-free transfer of plan assets to another plan or individual
retirement account that complies with the rules set forth in the Internal Revenue Code.
143. Carpenters Pension Trust v. Kronschnabel, 632 F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453
U.S. 922 (1981).
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substantial federal question operates as a decision on the merits. 1" The
Supreme Court's refusal to grant certiorari in Stone v. Stone'4 5 and the
Ninth Circuit's reasoning might suggest that the Supreme Court is at
present satisfied with the result of Carpenters Pension Trust Fund v.
Campa,1 6 that the Court considers the debate over preemption' 4 7 ended,
and that courts applying community property law may divide the retirement benefits in a qualified pension plan notwithstanding the language
of ERISA §§514(a) and 206(d)(1), and I.R.C. §401(a)(13) and the regulations thereunder. The one sentence statement in Campa14 1 that there
was no federal question is not an adequate manner of resolving such an
important dispute.' 49 The United States Supreme Court should, in the
absence of further Congressional action,' permit full briefing of the
question and should issue a decision which would give guidance to courts,
the Internal Revenue Service, and the Department of Labor.
VII. CONCLUSION
New Mexico courts have for the most part dealt well with the problem
of dividing retirement plan benefits pursuant to a dissolution of marriage
whether or not ERISA covered the retirement plans. There are indications
that when the New Mexico courts are confronted with the divisibility of
disability benefits from qualified retirement plans, the New Mexico courts
will fairly assess the extent to which such benefits should be characterized
as community property.
There is a need, however, for a more careful analysis by the New
Mexico Supreme Court of the problems and equities in dividing unvested
benefits under qualified retirement plans. The traditional strong deference
for family law and state property law fully justify the lower courts' findings
that there is no preemption of state community property law by ERISA
because there is no strong federal interest or clear legislative intent sufficient to justify such preemption. Further, any finding of preemption
would throw the entire area of domestic relations law and retirement plans
into confusion, and would result in the filing of a huge number of petitions
requesting courts either to reconsider awards or to clarify the state of the
law.
144. 632 F.2d at 747.
145. 632 F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 922 (1981).
146. 444 U.S. 1028 (1980).
147. See R. Stem & E. Gressman, Supreme Court Practice 324 (5th ed. 1978).
148. 444 U.S. 1028 (1980).
149. Solomon, supra note 120, at 1027.
150. Senator Robert Dole recently introduced a bill, S. 19, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. (1983), entitled
the Retirement Equity Act of 1983. S. 19 would clarify that accrued retirement benefits may be
subject to division pursuant to the dissolution of a marriage. The bill would also affirm the Internal
Revenue Service's position that no retirement plan can be required to distribute plan assets not yet
in pay status. See supra text accompanying note 136.
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Nonetheless, there is considerable confusion as to the reach of the
preemption and anti-alienation provisions. If Congress does not act, the
United States Supreme Court and the administrative agencies charged
with enforcing the provisions of ERISA should clarify the meaning of
the preemption and anti-alienation sections of ERISA. Any legislative,
judicial, or administrative rulings on these points should preserve flexibility for state courts and, within reasonable limits, defer to state property
law. It seems that Congress, the Internal Revenue Service, and the Department of Labor unwisely have left much unclear with respect to the
payment of benefits not in pay status and the division of benefits as
community property.

